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O) INTRODUCTION 
Taxation ofpersonal incarne is typically seen as one ofthe most adequate forms oftaxation, 
in terms of fairness cri teria. 
Progressivity in taxation, in modem tax systems , is essentially attained through the incarne 
tax, having two essential equity principies that will be developed and explored throughout this 
work: horizontal equity and vertical equity (Jeading to progressivity). ln spite ofthe central role 
ofboth, we have chosen to place a greater emphasis on the analysis ofthe former. 
Generally, vertical equity recommends differentiation oftax liabilities according to differences 
of tax unifs (equivalent) incarne, while horizontal equity demands equality in the fiscal 
treaunent of tax units in lhe sarne circumstances. Therefore, these are principies of 
distributional equity. 
Despi te the wide agreement, among politicians, academicians, and citizens in general, on the 
validity ofthese major principies, their practical implementation in tax systems is very often 
embodied in controversy since they are derived from normative views on the distributional 
aspects oftaxation, the extent ofwhich depends, ultimately, on subjective considerations about 
social justice, i.e. on personal tastes. 
The identification ofthese normative views, and the analysis ofthe measurement issues related 
to the degree ofexisting vertical equity (linked to the progressivity ofthe tax system) and of 
horizontal inequity induced by the incarne tax will be the central concem ofthis work. 
After having properly defined the idea of progressivity ofthe incarne tax, primary importance 
wi ll be given to the concept ofhorizontal inequity, as well as to possible ways ofassessing its 
magnilude in a certain tax system: measurement techniques -also embodying normative views 
and serious methodological problems- will be analysed and severa! measures of horizontal 
inequity will be presented. Finally, an empirical application will illustrate these latest aspects. 
1) THE PROGRESSIVE lN COME TAX 
The incarne taxis said to be progressive when the average rate oftaxation that an income unit 
faces increases with its levei of (pre~tax) incarne. 
ln mathematical terrns, if we define t(x) as the tax payment of an incarne unit with a levei of 
incarne x, progressivity of t(x) means that t(x)lx is an increasing funct ion of x. 
Moreover, asswning differentiability of t(x) , progressivity ofthe incarne tax (in a strict sense) 
thus irnplies: 
d [ 1(x)/x ] I dx > O, for ali x.2 
By allowing t(x) <O, we include here the possibi li ty of negative incarne taxes, i.e. income-
related benefits. 
Analysis ofprogressivity is typically carried with the help oftwo strong assumptions, that do 
not hold in real world situations; on the one hand, that there is a comrnon schedule r(x) 
applying equally to ali tax units3, and on the other, that the population of incarne units is 
homogeneous. This is to say that we assume a population of comparable units, allowing 
(artificiall y) for abstraction from the issue ofhorizontal equity, in order to focus on vertical 
equity considerations. Even ifheterogeinity ofincome units is allowed, progressivity analysis 
is then perfonned using equivalent incarne, with the further assumption that this coincides 
totally with ali tax code requirements. In other words. distributional analysis ofthe incarne tax 
typicall y has implied a divorce between the concepts of vertical and horizontal equity. 
Progressivity measures (some of which will be rnentioned be low) are thus, in most of the 
literature on public finance, essentially linked to vertical equity, impl icitly assurning the 
existence of perfect horiwntal equity in the tax system under analysis, and therefore, Jeading 
2 lfthe incarne taxis proportional, the average tax rate is constant for any leve[ ofincome and thi s implies an 
equa lity in this mathematical expression. 
3 We will use the tcnns "income unit", "tax unit'' or '·fiscal unit" as having exactly lhe sarne meaning: thcy rcfer 
to thc unit -individual. family, household, equivalem aduh- that pays the income tax . This aspect will be 
considered more deeply in section 3.2 ofthis work. 
to biased conclusions in distributionaJ assessrnent of incarne taxation. 
Theoretically, the irnplications of a progressive incarne tax, in tenns of it being inequality 
reducing and (cornparatively) welfare irnproving, have been widely established and rnastly 
verified in ernpirical studies. 
Jakabsson and Fellrnan have separatelly proved that, under standard assumptions about the 
incarne tax, its progressivity rneans that it reduces inequality frarn the pre to the posHax 
distribution of incarne.~ 
Assuming a harnogeneous population (ar subpopulatian) aftax units, to which the tax cade 
applies equally, the Jakobsson-Fellrnan theorerns shows that a progressive incarne tax implies 
dispraportianality in tax payments amang incarne units with distinct leveis of pre-tax incarne, 
causing thus a greater degree of equality in the post-tax distributian af incarne. These two 
aspects of the tax -departure from proportionality and redistributive effect- are the basic 
features ofits progressivity. Redistributive effect can be seen as a function afthe levei (related 
to the average tax rate) and of the panem of taxes (linked to its departure frorn 
propartianality).This result has been shown by Kakwani (1976). 
Considering now the irnpact on social welfare, this is typically assessed abstracting frorn lhe 
benefits that tax units receive from government' s role in modem economies, related namely 
with the production and provision ofpublic or merit goods.ln this cantext, (positive) incarne 
taxation can only reduce welfare: in spite of reducing inequality, it provokes a reduction of 
disposable incomé for ali incarne units. This conclusion is valid according to ali Paretian 
social welfare functions (hereafter, SWF). 
• See Jakobsson (1976) andlor Fellman (1976) for funher details. 
~ For a mathematical proofofthis resuh, see Lambert (1993), p.\50. 
6 ln this very partia! equilibrium ana\ysis, we stress again. 
Consequently, having a generalised utilitarian SWF as the criterion for welfare analysis, 
progressivity is only seen as welfare improving by comparison with another way oftaxation: 
a praportional incarne tax, raising exactly the sarne revenue (equal-yield proportional tax). 
After applying a progressive tax to some pre-tax distributian of incarne, the post tax incarne 
distribution will have the sarne mean after the imposition of an equal-yield proportional tax on 
the sarne pre-tax distribution; the progressive tax of course has a more equalizing effect, while 
the proportianal tax is neutral (inequality-preserving). Using the well-knawn Atkinson's 
theorem7, we can conclude that a progressive incarne taxis comparatively welfare-improving8, 
i.e. reduces welfare by less than a proportional tax raising the sarne revenue, from the sarne pre-
tax distribution of incarne. 
Progressive taxation is thus socio-economically seen as a way ofreducing disparities of "well-
being" amang a populatian of incarne units, and it is intuitively accepted as an equitable 
method afpublic intervention. The polemic issue is, however, agreement among politicians, 
theorists and vaters, an the "adequate" degree ofprogression ofthe incarne tax, which varies 
intime, place and also according to individuals'preferences and moral values. 
The redistributive effect of a progressive incarne tax is identified with its vertical effect, when 
it is assumed that the tax causes no horizontal inequities (ar reranking of incarne units). 
Progression is thus nonnally assessed having incarne redistribution theory as the underlying 
adequate framework for analysis. 
Jakobsson (1976) quotes Musgrave and Thin (1948) and the four local measures of progression 
that they rnention: average rate progression, marginal rate progressian, liability progression and 
residual incarne progression. Notwithstanding, this author considers that any measure of 
progression is adequate only if progressivity of a tax so measured corresponds to a certain levei 
of redistribution of incarne, and changes in progression signify changes in redistributive effect; 
residual progression is the only one obeying this principie. 
7 Atkinson ( 1970). 
1 ln the class of generalised utilitarian SWF defined as above (namely, additively separable. symmetric and 
concave). 
;::·· ... ~-
Oth f th d f · · r nk d · d" ·b · ffi ( ~' •h i _g er measures o e egree o progressrvrty, r e to rts re rstn uuve e ect, cr-;~ c ,...r 
Kakwani index (K), measuring the disproponionality of taxes9 -defmed as the differenc 
between the concentration and Gini coefficients for, respectively, tax liabilities10 and pre-tax 
incarne- and the Reynolds-Srnolensky index (RS) of the redistributive effect, given by the 
difference berween the concentration coefficient for post-tax incarne and the Gini coefficient 
for pre-tax incarne. These are overall measures of progressiviry and the relation between them 
is: 
RS~g / (1-g)K, 
with g standing for the average tax rate that corresponds to the progressive incarne tax being 
applied. 11 
Assuming the inexistence of horizontal inequity (and of reranking of tax units), the 
redistributive effect of a progressive incarne tax depends not only on the average tax rate, but 
also on the magnitude ofits disproportionality effect. 
~ See Kakwani ( 1976). 
10 We are referring to concentration curves since the hypothesis of inexistence of horizontal inequity and of 
reranking, among tax units, induced by the incom e tax can not be accepted as realistic: therefore, the 
concentration curves for tax liabilities and post-tax income will not coincide with the corresponding Lorenz 
curves. 
11 This result is proved by Kakwani (1976) and will be useful in section 4 ofthis work, when we analyse measures 
ofhorizontal inequity. 
2) HORIZONTAL EQIDTY 
The principies of horizontal and vertical equity have a central role in any discussion about 
incarne taxation. We have already defined very broadly horizontal equity (henceforth HE) as 
demanding that people in equal circumstances before tax should be treated equally by the tax 
system, while vertical equiry (VE) requires that tax payments of incarne units should be 
differentiated, as a (positive) function oftheir ability-to-pay, for example in arder to equalize 
their sacrifice on a utility basis. It is essential to develop measures ofthe extent to which a 
specific tax system conforms, or not, with these principies, in arder to compare systems, 
analyse the evolution of tax policy in a certain system, or recorrunend policy changes. We will 
focus on this aspect in the next chapters of this work; for now, the analysis af the cancept of 
HE and afthejustificatians for its violatian in modem tax systems, will be aur cancero. Unless 
we interpret "circumstances" rnerely as incarne leveis. it already becarnes abviaus that the 
princ ipie af HE is related to a tax schedule that cannat naively be fonnulated as t(x), like we 
did before. 
HE requires that twa incarne units having the sarne pre-tax equivalent incarne. the sarne 
abilities and the sarne needs, shauld have the sarne tax liability (again, in tenns af equivalent 
income)12• 
Feldstein (1976, p.83) has considered the problern of the diversity of tastes arnong incarne 
units, that renders the typical definitian af HE as arnbiguaus, and has redefined it as follows: 
"Iftwo individuais would be equally well off(have the sarne utility levei) in the absence of 
taxation, they should also be equally well off if there is a tax" 
Very rareiy is the tax unit the single individual, a fact wh ich raises probiems in the definition 
ofthe utility levei ofthe tax unit, as with equivalence scaies. Moreover, utility leveis "in the 
absence of taxation" simpiy do not exist, unless we assume that taxation does not affect 
individual decisons (and the shape and arguments oftheir utility functions), namely in what 
12 lt simi larly demands, of course, that they should receive the sarne amount of public benefits. 
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incentives are concerned. Despite these drawbacks, this definition has the advantage of 
referring to utility (and not simply to incarne), requiring that taxes should not alter the ranking 
of individuais by utility levei. 
Severa! views on HE and VE have been expressed by distinct authors, and usually there is less 
controversy around the concept of HE than around the precise definition of VE. HE is 
consensually accepted as a fair principie Wlder any modem forrnulation of the theory of 
distributive justice, while VE is ernbodied with disagreements about the "appropriate" pattern 
of differentiation between different individuais, varying according to normative values. ln spite 
ofthis, for a long time the analysis oftax equity was primarily concemed with VE and "the 
problems of HE have received close attention only since the 1930s" (Pechman, 1989, p.42). 
Moreover, this !ater principie was commonly seen as a derived consequence from the main rule 
ofVE by many authors, including Musgrave, who, however has more recentlyl 3 changed his 
view on this, recognizing the normative independency and essentiality ofboth principies, as 
fundamental rules of equity on taxation, whose violation leads to a reduction in aggregate 
social welfare. For social ethics, HE is nowadays not only strongly established, but also 
established in a more popular and firm way than the principie ofVE. 
There are three main views on the nonnative importance ofHE14 • directly link:ed to the role of 
the state as a redistributor agent through taxation: a libertarian view of social justice (related 
to authors such as Robert Nozick), in its most extremist fashion, considers the pre-tax 
distribution of incarne as the fairest one, HE (as any "distortion" introduced by the state's 
activity) being thus a very significant issue. Opposing to this view, the utilitarians (and, also, 
the advocates ofRawlsian positions) judge the state's intervention as morally essential in terms 
of redistribution: HE is not given a great irnportance, the centra l concem being with the post-
tax distribution ofincorne. Finally, a distinct position focuses not so much on the pre or post-
tax distributions ofincome per se, but more on the means by which differences between them 
are acomplished, HE being morally justified as "a safeguard against capricious discrimination" 
° For funher details, see Musgrave ( 1990), p.ll3- 11 4. 
14 Atkinson (1980). 
by the state15 and ensuring "that the law does not serve anybody's self-interest"16 . 
The ethical status of HE varies thus according to the view defended by each individual. 
However, the study of the magnitude of horizontal inequity (henceforth HI) induced by the 
incarne tax has always a scientific interest on its own. 
For the incarne tax to respect entirely the principie ofHE, it should appiy to every source of 
incarne and allow for differentiation probably onJy in terms oftax units' incarnes, needs and 
some special features such as disabiiity or age. The differentiation oftax payments in terms, 
for instance, of the famiiy composition, normally through a system of allowances and 
exemptions, is thus a way of impiementing this equiry principie in real worid taxation. 
However, other types of differentiation are typically used, nameiy according to the source of 
incarne (distinct fi scal treatment ofearned incarne, dividends or capital gains, omission ofthe 
imputed value of lhe rent for home-owners, or of received fringe benefits, exemptions for 
benefit payments, among other exampies), and to the use of incarne (deductions and 
allowances are justified for a variety of reasons, such as charitabie transfers, medical, ch.iidcare 
and education expenses, insurance premium payments, retirement plans, interest on 
mortgages). ln these rwo cases we can question the justice argument: they can be seen as ways 
of arbitrariiy discriminating between the incarne units, ieading to vioiations of the HE 
principie. Other sources ofHI are regional differentiation of otherwise equal fiscal units based 
on their piace ofresidence (for exampie: rural versus urban areas), as well as probiems oftax 
evasion or of noncompiiance of tax payments. 
It becomes evident that compiexification of the tax code, in terms of the permined deductions, 
allowances, credits or exclusions (not directly linked to the househoid type or composition), 
will tend to increase lhe degree of H1 among tax units of equai pre-tax incarne (or 
comprehensive incarne) and its simplification wiii have the opposite effect. 
Retuming to a utility-based definition of HE, whenever individuais have different utility 
15 Musgrave ( 1959), quoted on Atkinson (1980). 
16 Lamben and Yitzhaki ( 1995), p.674. This paper focuses mainly on the legal foundation ofthe principies ofVE 
and HE as basic fearures of social justice. 
functions, needs and abilities, any income tax will induce HI (assessed in terms of pre and post-
tax incomes oftax Wlits); the definition ofthe relevant needs and family structures that have 
to be considered in the appropriate setting ofthe comprehensive tax base itself, embodies value 
judgements and arbitrary choices. Illustrating this, Manser (1979, p.224) says: "~rithout 
knowledge of how the household objective function is related to the utility functions of lhe 
individuais forming the household, it is not clear how welfare comparisons can be made 
between married and single individuais", and problems are worsened when we consider other 
(more complex and varied) types ofhouseholds (or tax units). 
Therefore, we have to stress that a totally horizontal equitable income tax is not possible to 
design in real world tax systems. The issue is, thus, one of minimizing the degree of Hl. 
fn reality, the heterogeneity of the tax units in terms of their composition, family type and 
special needs (among other factors), complexifies the analysis of HE, unless of course the tax 
code requirements would correspond entirely to some universally accepted concept of 
equivalent income17• For this hypothetical situation, HI would arise whenever income units 
with the sarne pre-tax equivalem income ended up with distinct post-tax equivalem incarne. 
With a social heterogeneous population, this is the typical approach adopted in the analysis and 
measurement ofthis issue. However, it still raises major problems in international comparisons 
for cases where distinct countries consider different equivalent scales in their assessment ofHI. 
The modelling ofthe incarne tax for equity analysis purposes demands then. either the use of 
equivalem incarne, a solution which, as we will see", if totally meaningful in theorethical 
terms, has a subjective (and controversial) foundation in its application. or, alternatively, 
distinct schedules for each truly homogeneous subgroup of the total population (however 
defined). Only for income units ali of the sarne type analysis, for instance, of the degree of 
progression is a sensible exercise. Social heterogeinity implies the definition of a set of 
progressive tax schedules, each being simultaneously the least horizontally inequitable 
possible, anda global analysis ofprogressivity and ofHI is not in general possible. 
17 The definition of equivalem income and the consideration of the problems related tO this conccpt will be 
developed in section 3. 
1
* Problems with equivalence scales will be treated deeply in section 3.2 a) ofthis worlc 
!O 
Having said this, the main idea which we want to stress at this point is that the redistributive 
effect of a progressive income tax (fonnerly, under the restrictive set of assumptions made, 
identified with its vertica1 effect) depends not only on VE considerations, but a1so crucially on 
the degree ofHI. The unequal treatment of equal tax units by the income tax globaJiy causes 
a reduction in the magnitude of its redistributive capacity, implying a loss of its venicaJ 
performance when compared to a reference situation of a progressive tax which is horizontally 
equitable. The assessment of the extent of HI is thus essential, and it may be an important 
factor in understanding why, in fact, income tax systems may be less progressive than a priori 
we would expect. 
Developing measures that allow us to confirm the extent to which a tax system is venically and 
horizontally equitable, relating these two concepts and understanding their inter dependency, 
has been a major task in recent decades in the public finance literature. ln the next chapter we 
will focus on some ofthe practical concepts and methodological problems linked to this issue 
anda few analytical measures will be surveyed in chapter 4. 
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3) MEASUREMENT ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 
3.1) THE CONCEPT OF Hl l N PRACTICE 
The issue of defining a methodology to swnmarize the magnitude of ex.isting 1-il and its relarion 
to tbe global performance of the incarne tax, incorporating simultaneously, in overall 
indicators, VE characteristics, is complex. This complexity starts with disagreement between 
distinct theorists on how Hl is manifested, some identifying it with reranking effects and others 
clearly distinguishing it from these: HI in the incarne tax may change the ordering of 
individuais from the pre to the post tax distribution of incarne, although this is not an inevitable 
effect. 
Feldstein, defines Hl in tenns of the reranking of utility leveis between tax units, and he has 
thus proposed a measure ofthis effect in terms ofthe rank correlation coefficient between the 
ordering of utilities from the preto the post-tax situation. The largest disadvamage ofthis view 
is that it demands the specification of the tax uni ts' uti li ty function(s), which is highly 
controversial in practical, empirical terms. Besides this, the concept of HI is intuitively related 
to, and theoretically founded on, aspects of income red istribution, of income differences that 
arise in cases where they did not exist before, as a consequence of income taxation; measures 
based on ranking effects are linked to measures of income redistribution among pre tax equals, 
but this relation is not simple19. 
19 The reranking approach to the measurement ofHI has emerged since the beginning ofthe 80s (initially with 
Atkinson and Plomick ·s papers) as a separate -although partia!- strand in this type ofliterarure. We have chosen 
not to focus deeply on this specific approach; for a detailed comparison ofboth strands see Lambert and Ramos 
(1997b). 
12 
Atkinson (1980) has shown that inequality in post-tax income is sensitive to ranking changes. 
H e considers that the measurernent of HI is related both with alterations in the position of pre 
and posHax Lorenz curves, and with the degree of "mobility" caused by income taxation 
(establishing an analogy of this laner effect with the measurement of social mobility across 
severa! generations); reranking effects in themselves do not affect the magnitude of post-tax 
inequality arnong pre tax equals, but they can nevertheless constitute an important factor 
in.fluencing some ways of measu.ring these inequality effects20. His proposed index ofreranking 
effects can be seen as a partial measure of HI. Similarly, a measure exclusively based on 
redistribution features, and ignoring reranking effects, may not be seen to account for Lhe total 
degree of Hl induced by the income tax. 
Plotnick (1981) proposed the Preorder lnequity Index (PII) as a measure of Hl that, however, 
considers only the magnitude ofreranking effects caused by the income tax policy. He chooses 
to ignore aspects ofHllinked to inequality (introduced by the tax among pre-tax equals) and 
focuses exclusively on reranking effects: "while determining the appropriate preredistribution 
ranking in the absence of a particular redistributive policy presents serious problems, it is 
ranking which is essential for assessing HI"21 . PII is constructed on Lhe basis ofthe normalized 
relation bet\veen the post-tax Lorenz curve and Lhe post-tax concentration curve (with the value 
zero meaning perfect HE, and 1 implying maximum HI), being sensitive simultaneously to 
reranking effects induced by the incarne tax, and to the leveis of incarne differences observed. 
Besides being a partia! measure of HI , PII has the additional disadvantage of embodying a 
valuejudgement that may not however be particularly appealing to social analysts: reranking 
effects affecting tax units at higher pre-tax income leveis are valued more by this index than 
the ones occuring at lower incarne leveis. 
ln the beginning of lhe 1980s, after Feldstein' s and Alkinson and Plotnick 's imponant papers. 
the methodological tendency in H! measurement was thus to focus on the assessment of 
reranking of tax units affected by the incarne tax. This happened also due to some empírica! 
2° For further details on how reranking effects affect the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient, see Atkinson 
(1980), p. 9 to 13. 
~~ Plotnick (1981), p.284. 
13 
difficulties in measuring "classical" HI dueto the problem of the identification of equals (as 
we will see in section 5). The no reranking condition is, as we mentioned, necessary for the 
existence of HE but it is not sufficient. Therefore, this measurement approach is fraught with 
problems and has an additional drawback ofimplicitly asswning that the pre-tax ranking oftax 
units by leveis of well-being (that should not be "disturbed" by the income tax) is the fair one. 
Musgrave (1990, p.l17) proposes an abstract notion of"social welfare cost" as a measure of 
HI: "applied to any one group of equals, HE performance is measured by the excess of the 
combined actual welfare cost for that group over what it would have been with equal division 
ofliability v.1lhin the group", anda different local measured levei ofHI ("excess cost") can be 
determined for each group. The entire levei of Hl (somehow also related to the principie ofVE) 
has, then, to be buih by some aggregation procedure (which Musgrave considers that should 
be independent from local leveis of well -being22) and a value of zero for this index would 
reflect perfect HE. 
This approach, despite having the disadvantage ofthe concept of"well-being" oftax units not 
being operational in practical work, is theoretically appealing and does not focus so much on 
the study ofreranking (or tax induced mobiliry) aspects. 
The need to choose the least horizontally inequitable income tax system (or incarne tax refonn) 
makes indispensible the measurement of this aspect. A currently followed approach in 
measurement theory, in the line ofMusgrave 's proposed measure, is related to the assessment 
of local HI among pre-tax equal income units, using for this purpose inequality measures, 
followed by some aggregation procedure ofthese local measures into an overall measure ofHI. 
This final measure. as we will see, incorporates, either implicitly or explicitly, the "classical" 
HI considerations and the reranking problems oftax: units. 
ln this context, measurement of H! has ali the well-known methodological problems of 
inequality measurement, that will be the concem of the next section ofthis work. 
ll We will mention lmer some problems with aggregation procedures of local HJ mcasures. 
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3.2) METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS lN MEASURJNG lll AS INEQUALITY 
The initial obvious difficulty is the practical delimitation ofthe groups ofequals; using simply 
pre-tax incarne as the operational variable for this purpose -"equals" being those incarne units 
with the sarne pre-tax levei of real incarne- is unsati sfactory, as we will see. Defining the tax 
unit is also problematic and choosing an appropriate measure for inequality (local HI) 
assessment has distinct implications in normative terms, as the choice of lhe aggregation 
procedure (for the determination of an overall effect) has. 
Another major problem is related to the definition of"inequity" and the quantitative assessment 
ofits extent. Jolmson and Meyer 23 point that we can: "define Lhe magnitude ofan inequity in 
tenns of the dollar value of the tax discrimination involved. It can be assumed to be 
proportional to the value involved or it can be treated as an increasing or decreasing function 
thereof .... .inequities are not ali equal but do in some way have different magnitudes". The 
economic measurement of HI always embodies value judgements, whose implications it is 
essential to know a priori, since they also determine the resulting levei of measured inequity. 
besides the inequity per se. We are focusing exclusively on measuring locally HI as economic 
inequality2\ and by inequality it is meant the existence of differences in the distribution of a 
relevant variable among a specific population (in this case, the pre-tax equals), in a period of 
time. The terrn embodies simultaneously a moral aspect related to the undesirability of its 
occurrence. The positive vs. norrnative approaches to measurement of inequality seem clearly 
diverse, but in practice they are intimately Jin.ked as it will be shown. 
We will expose the measurement problems as follows: a) prior problems to consider when 
:u Johnson and Meyer ( 1962), p.458. 
1
• Although this fonn of inequality is usually linked to politicai or socia l inequality. 
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measuring local H1 as economic inequality; b) the choice ofthe inequality measure; and fmally, 
c) the aggregation procedure into an overall HI measure. 
a) Measuring economic ioequality: "prior" p roblems 
The initial problem is: ioequality ofwhat? How can we best represem tax units well-being 
using a unidimensional scale, a unique variable, for this purpose? 
The most usual dimension considered when assessing inequality is income (pre and post-tax 
income to assess local HI)2s and severa! factors have to be taken imo account when analysing 
it. ln general, its differences must be judged having in mind not only that individuais have 
distinct leveis of eamings and wealth (the two main sources of income), but also that they have 
different needs, distinct tastes (regarding work/leisure, investment in human capital saving and 
risk, for instance) and abi lities, leading to different choices/opportunity sets, that they face 
expectable variations in income according to their life-cycle and that they are affected diversily 
by random factors such as luck. Therefore, equality in pre-tax income should not always entail 
the inexistence of inequality or injustice a priori; the income tax can, thus, be seen as a source 
of inequality enhancement between '·equals" but can also reduce inequity bet\veen income units 
wi th the sarne pre-tax income. Taking the pre-tax distribution of income -egalitarian among 
equals so defined- as the reference in tenns of fairness may be misleading. Nevertheless, th.is 
is the typical procedure taken as valid in empirical work. 
Other dimensions that could be considered are wealth (a stock, at some moment of time, of 
multidimensonal values -like physical goods, financial assets or human capital- thus hard to 
assess fully) or some welfare indices, linked to utility concepts -like in Feldstein and 
Musgrave's formulations of the concept of horizontal equity- and even harder to measure. 
u We refer only to currem income (abstracling from lifetime income and mobility·type effects in the unequali ty 
of equals); equivalem income will be considered deeply below. 
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Related to this last dimension is the concept offull.income26, including money and non·money 
income, where the fonner includes wage and non·wage (e.g. capital gains) income and the 
latter refers to the satisfaction (utility) derived from work and leisure, to the value of own 
production and the services ofphysical wealth, or, more broadly, to an individual's (or income 
unit's) opportunity set. HE wou1d require that this potential power to consume goods · Whether 
or not it is fully exercised· was preserved by the income tax for each and ali groups of units 
with equal opporrunity sets before the tax. 
Due to obvious difficulties in operating this concept in practice , empirical studies normally 
concentrare on incarne or on equivalent income. According to Simons27, "incarne is the value 
ofrights that a person might have exercised in consumption without altering the value ofhis 
wealth" or, equivalently, is "the sum of (I) the market value of rights exercised in consumption 
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end 
of the period'". ln this definition are included many variables that, however, are often 
disregarded in usual tax codes and oficial statistics, like capital gains and losses, the imputed 
rent in the case of house·owners, the va lue of production for own consumption and fringe 
benefits. 
ln spite of ali the loss of accuracy that simplifications imply and considering that with this 
unidimensional variable, a large amount of relevant information about well·being and tax units ' 
utility is lost, real money incarne (pre and post tax) is a very commonly used variable for the 
assessment ofHI, measured as inequality. 
The next methodological problem to consider is inequali ty of whorn? The problem of the 
definition of the tax unit is also controversial, since different possible samples, leading to 
distinct conclusions about horizontal inequity, can be considered: the individuaL the nuclear 
family, the household , or the "equivalent adu lt" . The appropriate unit that the tax code and 
empirical studies should consider is "a unit in which economic decisions about paid and w1paid 
26 Barr ( l993), p. l33. 
n Qu01ed in Atkinson ( 1983), p.37. 
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work and about consurnption are made jointly and i.n which resources are pooled".21 
Therefore, if we take the individual as the basis of analysis we can reach very biased results, 
seeing that many individuais with zero (pre-tax) incarne (e.g. housewives, students) share i.n 
fact, incarne (and consumption) with other individuals. On the other hand, taking the household 
as a unit implies quite strong assumptions about the way resources are shared in its interior. 
General ly, the larger the units considered (for any distribution ofincome across these units), 
the smaller will be the (global) inequality observed. 
21 Piachaud, in Barr and Whynes ( 1993), p.l 08. 
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The measurement ofthe degree of incarne sharing within a unit is then essential, but extremely 
difficult to achieve29• Therefore, general scales of equivalence of incarne have been 
constructed, although not without some controversy, for the purpose of comparing units with 
different numbers (and rypes) of elements. An equivalence scale is a device to convert incarnes 
of distinct incarne units into a common base, measuring the purchasing power -or utility- per 
unit, against which horizontal inequity is then properly assessed. Incarne per capila is 
considered a misleading indicator , since there are economies of scale within a unit and 
individuals'needs vary, according for instance to their age. Equivalising incarne makes then 
households with different needs and composition comparable fo r normative purposes, but the 
choice of an "appropriate" equivalence scale makes a considerable difference to the assessment 
of the degree of inequality (local HI) of their "well-being". 
The starting point may be a single person (with avalue of one) and for each additional member 
different (subjective) ponderations are considered, trying to equivalise incarne between 
households ofdifferent types; a set of deflators (considering, namely. specific needs and age) 
is built, and the adjusted incarne results from the division of the household income by Lhe 
correspondent value ofthe equivalence scale. 
The theory of equivalence scales arises from demand theory and it typically assumes that ali 
households have equal utility functions (neglecting the special case ofthe sick, for instance). 
Moreover, it is inevitably taken as val id the possibility ofmaking interpersonal comparisons 
ofutility among (and within) different units30• 
%9 For funher details on the measurement ofintra-household inequality, see Borooah and McKee (1994). 
Jo For funher details on this criticism, see Fisher (1987). 
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Another central contentious aspect is related to the impossibility of transferring units of 
equivalent incarne between different tax units31 • ln real world tax systems, incorne -and not 
equivalent incarne- is the variable used for redistributive purposes, raising severe practical 
problerns when we use the mentioned concept. Linked to this point is also the inconsistency 
of some of the underlying SWF to the equivalence scales, fact which has led Ebett to refer to 
the concept of"equivalent adult", when analysing the application ofthe principie oftransfers 
to equivalent income.32 
Besides their subjectivity and possible theoretical inconsistency, another interesting criticism 
made ofthese scales is that they asswne the fact that parents·well-being depends only on their 
expendinrre levei and ignores the fact that they may derive utility from their children (i.e. a 
couple with a chi ld could in fact have a higher levei of"full-income per capira" than a couple 
without children). 
Tax equity analysis typically abstracts from ali these problems assuming a socially 
homogeneous popuJation. The real world incarne tax normally disregards (and violates) the 
utility-based definition of HE. This analytical procedure may however involve major 
inconsistencies and less accurate measurement results than the use of equivalence. An obvious 
extension ofthe utility-based definition of HE to the case ofa social heterogeneity requires 
households with the sarne "pre-tax equivalent incarne" to be treated equal ly, i.e. to end up with 
the sarne ·'post-tax equivalent incarne" 33 
Finally, we need to ask: inequality considering which period? To assess inequality, we can 
consider diverse possibilities of time period, e.g. 3 months. a year, a decade or an individual's 
li fetime. The most commonly used dimension is the year, but the choice depends on the 
objectives of the specific study. ln general , the Jonger the time period considered, the less 
HConsider, for instance, the equiva1ence sca1e: Z = (Number of adults + ~.Number of children) .,... Ifwe wam 
to transfer 1 unit of equivalem income from a rich single to a poor coup1e, for the former this I unit ofequivalent 
income corresponds to $1, while for the latter I unit of equivalent income demands $1.41; so, the problem is 
unsolvable, and the transferis not possible! 
~~For funher details on SWF under1ying equivalence scales and the concept of"equivalent aduh", see Eben 
( 1997). 
u For funher details on comparison ofhouseholds with different struciUres for HE analysis purposes, see Manser 
( 1979). 
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unequal will (seem to) be the distribution of incarne. For the study of HI, the time~ 
considered is typically the fiscal year, whose defi.nition may, however, differ considerably from 
one country to another. 
Ali the above-mentioned problems affect the results ofthe measurement exercise and can raise 
major problems for international comparisons of tax systems using distinct definitions of 
incarne (which is, already by itself, a very limited proxy of units'utility levei), incarne unit, 
fi scal year or different equivalence scales . 
b) Thc eh o ice of the inequality mcasure 
When we express incarne inequality by a unidimensional variable, this corresponds to some 
implicit abbreviation ofa SWF, considering it as a multidimensional phenomenon. The nature 
of the inequality measure is therefore dependent on the properties and characteristics of an 
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original, global SWF, whose features it is imponant to consider and analyse34. A funher 
previous observation is that any inequality measure uses, as an ideal reference, the totally 
egal itarian distribution ofincome; for the study ofHE in the incarne tax, this may be seen as 
"correct" only when we are using equivalent incarne and assuming identical tastes and abilities 
among the various incarne units. 
The issue is thus how can we best construct a scalar rneasure ofinequality, and what normative 
judgernents and views about inequity underlie it? 
Inequality índices have typically been developed with major anention being placed on 
statistical rather than on ethical purposes. ln any case, a notion of equity, either implicit or 
explicit, is always embodied in these measures, and many statistical indices have proved to 
have undesirable properties from a normative perspective. However, a convincing welfare 
rationale must always be present in any statistical index to be used in inequality analysis. 
Contrasting with this approach, explicitly normative inequality measures have been built ab 
inirio from an ethical point of view, departing from the formulation of some convincing and 
consensual SWF, such as the Atkinson index, as we will see below. 
ln this context, we will present some possible índices fo r the measurement -as inequality of 
post-tax incarne among pre-tax equals- of HI , dividing this presentat ion between: i) statistical 
measures (or implicitly ethical measures), and considering, for these, both the concepts of 
relative and absolute inequality, and ii) normative measures (or explicitly ethical measures). 
i) Sta tistica l mcasurcs 
We initially need to distinguish between the concepts ofrelative and absolute inequality. The 
former means that inequality (both the feeling of faimess and Lhe way to measure it) is 
l • On this aspect see, for instance, Kondor (1975). 
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invariant to a proportionate change in ali income leveis (i.e. when income shares remain the 
sarne), while, alternatively, the latter implies that inequality is invariant 10 equal additions of 
income to ali income leveis. 
Statistical measures of rela tive inequality should satisfy a set of desirable properties, besides 
having a convincing welfare rationale. These properties are: 
- scale independence, demanding invariance of the inequality index to equiproportionate 
changes in ali leveis of income; 
- symmetry, meaning that permutation ofincornes in the distribution does not alter the value 
ofthe index; 
- obeyance to the principie of transfers, implying that the index must be directly sensitive to 
(rich-to-poor) transfers in the distribution (that do not change previous rankings) ; 
- decomposability, demanding that overall inequality should be decornposed, by the use ofthe 
index, in tem1s ofinequality within and inequality between subgroups ofthe total population 
of income units. If we wish the index to display this property, this will restrict the available 
choice ofindicators; for instance, the mean logaritlunic deviation confonns to it, but the Gini 
coefficient fails 10 obey it completely when there are overlaps between subgroup income 
ranges3s. 
l fan index ofinequaliry is decomposable, overall inequality (I) can be expressed as a weighted 
sum ofthe inequaliry values for the inequality within each subgroup ofthe population (with 
lhe weights depending on population shares and/or income shares), and another term measuring 
inequality between groups (Ia) assuming that in each group every unit has the correspondem 
mean income for that group: I = Ia+ L.. ak Ik, where lk stands for inequaliry within each of the 
subgroups in the population and ak are the corresponding weights for overall inequality within 
subgroups. 
JS ln fact. this is one ofthe motives why the use ofthe Gini is so popular in HI measurement ( including reranking 
effects).as wewillsee. 
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The rnean logarithmic deviation (:rvfLD) is a statistical measure which has been used in H1 
measuremen~6• mainly due to its decomposability properties as an inequaliry index. 
Mathematically, for a certain incarne (or equivalent incarne) distribution {Xh X2, .••. X,.} , the 
MLD is given by: M ~ l: ln(~ I ~) I N ; in the case ofthe measurement of H!, each group of 
incarnes~ will correspond to the post-tax incarnes of those who were equals before the tax 
(i.e., in this case, had the sarne income -or equivalent incarne- before the incarne tax). The 
MLD belongs to the general entropy class of inequality indices, thus being (completely 
decornposable) which rneans that aggregate inequality (overall HI) can be expressed as a 
function of the subgroup inequalities (related to local HI), of mean incarnes in each subgroup 
(to determine inequaliry between subgroups) and population shares37 (see above). This family 
of indices -the entropy indices- is usually strongly favored on the basis of its statistical 
advantages, although the study of its norrnative content is still quite incipient and its welfare 
rationale rernains unclear, reason why they are not consensually favored on ethical grounds. 
A widely used measure of relative inequality is the Gini coefficient, which summariscs into one 
nwnber the information embodied in a Lorenz cwve (since it corresponds to twice Lhe ratio of 
the area between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal and the total area under the diagonal, or 
line of complete equality). Mathematically, the Gini is given by the formula: 
G ~ 2.COV (X, Rank ofX in the income distribut ion) I ~ , 
with X standing for the (equivalent) incarne leveis (preordered in ascending order) and ~for 
the rnean incarne. Altematively, the Gini is half the arithmetic average of the absolute 
differences between ali pairs ofincomes: 
G ~ l:, l:, I Xi- Xj I I 2.N'.~, 
where N stands for lhe total number of income units. G will vary between O (for total equality) 
J6 See, for instance Lambert and Ramos (1997) for an application tO the Spanish income tax system. 
l7 For this index, th e aggregation weights for the inequalities within groups are a function only of population 
shares and thus are not dependem on incarne shares, differently from what happened with the Gini, as wc saw 
before. 
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and I (for maxirnwn inequality). The Gini uses ali lhe information available for lhe disrribution 
and normalises it, being scale independent, emphasizing absolute differences in units ' incarnes 
more than relative differences, and obeying the principie of transfers. However, the implicit 
SWF in the Gini coefficient may be considered as not specially appealing since the weights of 
people's incarnes in the distribution are determined by lhe person's (or other type ofincome 
unit) rank-order in the distribution and it does not satisfy the principie of diminishing transfers. 
The SWF implied in the Gini has no convincing ethical foundation based on desirable 
properties such as additiviry and strict concaviry departing from individualistic preferences. 
The Gini is not an utilitarian-based inequality index. 
Nevertheless, Sen (1973) has shown that a utilitarian rationale could be provided for the Gini 
coefficient, with hi s "pairwise maximin criterion" : ''suppose the welfare levei of any pair of 
individuais is equated to the welfare levei ofthe worst-offperson ofthe two. Then ifthe total 
levei of the group is identified with the swn ofthe welfare leveis ofall pairs, we get the welfare 
function underlying the Gini coeffic ient". 
Moreover. Lambert ( 1985) has also established a convincing welfare rationale where the Gini 
fits, based on the concepts of deprivation and altruism. 
Concluding, there are "valid" norma tive rationales for the use of the Gini coefficient as a 
measure of relative inequali ty, besides the statistical advantages pointed out above. The fact 
that the Gini does not satisfy completely the decomposability property when lhe incarne ranges 
overlap, works, paradmcically as an advantage when measuring Hl ; in this situation, the overall 
Gini for post-tax incarne (corresponding to the post-tax concentration curve) can be expressed 
as: G = G8 + ~ a~ G~ + R , wi th 0 8 accounting for inequality between (pre-tax equals) 
subgroups (assuming that in each subgroup there is HE), G~ measuring inequality within 
subgroups (i.e. "classicar' Hl), with ak being we ights function of population and income 
shares, and , finally , R standing for a general measure of the extent of overlap between 
subgroup distributions38, in other words, measuring the reranking effecy39. 
n ln che case ofa post-tax income distribution when the subgroups are pre-tax equals groups, ifwe decompose 
the Gini, R amounts to an Atkinson-Piotnick index ofreranking. 
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A second type of statistical measures are those related to absolute inequality. If the social 
analyst believes in absolute inequality, an index to assess it demands, instead of scale 
invariance, the property of invariance to equal additions to ali incarnes: equal additions of 
incarne to ali incarne leveis do not change the value of absolute inequality40• The most 
comrnon1y used index of absolute inequality is the absolute Gini, defined as: AG= IJ..G, (where 
G stands for the normal Gini- index ofrelative inequality), varying between O, for complete 
absolute equality, and )..1., for maximurn absolute inequality. 
The idea of absolute inequality, in measurement theory and in ethical tenns, is usually far less 
appealing than the concept of relative inequality, reason why we are not concentrating so 
deeply on it. ln any case, this concept can also be applied to the study ofHI, as we will see in 
further detail in section 4. 
ii) Norma tive measures 
19 For further details on lhe mathematicat decomposition ofthe Gini index, see Aronson and Lambert ( 1994). 
40 Note that this woutd reduce relative inequality. 
26 
StatisticaJ measures implicitly embody arbitrary SWFs, implying distinct value judgements 
(sometimes unacceptable, violating essentiaJ nonnative principies) conceming inequality. 
Therefore, initially Dalton, and then Atkinson (1970), proposed measures that reveal these 
values explicitly; onJy proceeding this way can it be clear what objectives are being 
incorporated in the analysis as a result of adopting a certain measure. We will be dealing 
exclusively with the concept of relative inequality and, again, only income infonnation is 
considered ethically relevant for the assessment of inequality (and, consequently, of Hit 1• ln 
this section we will focus on the Atkinson index"2, which can be used in the assessment ofthe 
magnitude ofHI, as it will be further illustrated in section 4 ofthis work. 
The SWF explicitly considered in the fonnulation of Atkinson's index is utilitarian-based, an 
average o[ individual utility-of-income fi.mctions, being additively separable, and symmetric43. 
Moreover, the class of utiliry functions allowed is restricted to the ones that are increasing 
(Paretian) and concave (i.e. rransfer-approving). Atkinson put forward the idea of"the equally 
distributed equivalent levei of income" (EDE, hereafter): "the levei of income per head which 
if equal\y distributed would give the sarne levei of welfare as the present distribution'"'", 
leading to the index of relative inequality, defined as: 
I ~ I- EDE/~, 
varying between O, for complete equality, and l, for maximum inequality. Relativeness of 
inequality is assured by a constant degree of (relative) inequality aversion, e (e>O to ensure 
41 We can use real income or, altematively. equivalem income ifwe desire to incorporate differem needs in our 
analysis, making it more realistic and consistem with real world social heterogeinity. 
~2 A possible topic for futme research could be linked to the study of the decomposability properties of the 
extended Gini index, developed by Yitzhaki (1983) with a very interesting set ofnonnative properties and some 
similarities with the Atkinson index, and its eventual application to the study of Hl. This task will not be 
performed in this work 
•J We can consider these general properties without the need of specifying a particular functional fonn for the 
SWF. 
~ Atkinson (1970), p.250. 
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transfer approval), corresponding to a general utility function having tbe form: 
U (X)~A+ B (X l-t/(1 - E)] , ifE>'l and U (X)~ !og. (X), if e~J"_ 
(A and B>O are constants) 
It becomes now clearer that avalue of O for I can be observed in two cases: either we have an 
equal distribution of incarne (i.e. X.= 11), ore= O (situation of indi ffe rence to the distribution 
of incarne). As X, diverges from the average value or the degree of inequality aversion (chosen 
by the social analyst) increases (with comparati vely more weight being given to transfers at the 
bottom than at Lhe top of the distribution), the value of I will rise. When e= oo, society's 
concem is assurned to be exclusively with Lhe worst-off individual (corresponding to a 
Rawlsian view of social justice). 
The idea of"inefficiency ofinequality" is central in Atkinson 's fonnulation : inequali ty (and 
so, as we wi ll see, HI) wastes social welfare. For a given e, the per capita cost of inequality can 
be represented by: C = (!l - EDE); if a value of C per capita were "thrown away" and the 
remaining incarne were redistributed equally, the levei ofwelfare would be the sarne as with 
the actual, unequal, distribution of incarne. The value of C obviously varies directly wi th Lhe 
degree of inequality aversion. 
The Atkinson measure is thus theoretically very appealing but, ·~ust as the earlier measures 
were not nonnatively much use, so this measure is not descriptively much use'""6 . Intemational 
comparisons of data on inequality may be meaningless, unless we hold e constant for ali 
countries, through time. 
~$ Atkinson's index is fonnulated from an analogy between risk theory under uncenainty (namely, risk aversion 
measures) and inequality theory . 
... Culyer (1991), p.123. 
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Moreover, Sen (1982, p.4l9) argues that this approach ignores Lhe distinction between 
inequality and losses insocial welfare from inequality; consequently, I should be seen as a 
measure of an analyst's sensitivity to inequality and not of inequality itself17. Atkinson 
considers that this does not diminish Lhe validity of its use, since, it "honestly" (by contrast 
with statistical measures) reveals the difference berween description and social judgements on 
welfare. ln fact, for a certain distribution of incarne, and given €, W = J-1{1 - I) is a welfare 
indicator, known as the money-metric welfare indicator. 
The índices ofrelative inequality that feature in recent HI measurement analysis are the Gini 
coefficient, the generalized fami ly ofentropy measures (ofwhich the MLD is an example) and 
the Atkinson index. For the assessment of abso lute inequality, the use of the absolute Gini 
coefficient is one possible choice. 
•
7 For funher details on normative problems, see Sen (1982). 
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c) Tbe aggregation procedure 
A final methodological stage in the measurernent of HI as inequality, is related to the 
aggregation rnethod. We have seen how, after previous indispensible definitions (of the 
relevant variable, income unit and time period), distinct inequa1ity measures, with specific 
statisticaJ properties and nonnative features, can be used to assesslocaJ Hl among (previously 
defined) pre-tax equals, considered in hornogeneous groups. The last stage of this exerci se is 
thus to aggregate these local measures of 1-ll for the whole population of tax units, into an 
overall measure ofthe Hl induced by the income tax system. This global measurement involves 
again value judgements. Besides the ones related to Lhe chosen measure by itself, there is some 
polemic around the issue of using apure (i.e. non-dependent on income) or an impure (i.e. 
incorne-dependent) weighting scheme for this purpose; the social analysf s ethical views on the 
relative importance of local horizontal inequities at distinct leveis of post-tax income will 
underlie the definition ofthe precise weighting scheme. Therefore, aggregation ofhorizontal 
inequities can be made either independently ofincome leveis, depending only on population 
shares (the relative sizes of the the groups of pre-tax equals), or weighting differently these 
inequities for different leveis of income; for instance. greater importance could be anached to 
local horizontal inequities among the groups with the lowest incomes than among the groups 
of pre-tax equals with the highest leveis of income45• By contrast, in the former case, of pure 
aggregation, we are implicitly assurning that: "any inequity of a given size is worth equal 
weight independent ofthe proportion ofincome or tax liability that the inequity represents'>-~9 . 
Musgrave (1990, p.l17/8) defends the use of a pure weighting scheme as a way of avoiding 
"inappropriate comparisons between unequals", but this issue is not consensual , as it is clear 
by what was said above. 
ln any case, as with the choice ofthe inequality measure for the local assessment ofHl, the 
analyst must select a preferred procedure hav ing present the nonnative implications of doing 
so. 
•• We have seen tllat for the MLD the weighting scheme is pure, depending on ly on population shares. while for 
the Gini coefficient the weights are dependem on population shares and income. 
•
9 Brennan (1971 ), p.454. 
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Summing up, having determined which particular proxy of utility is to be evaluated (which 
includes, usually, selecting a particular equivalence scale to apply to pre and post-tax income), 
the assessment period, the type oftax unit to be considered, the inequality measure to be used 
in the measurement of local HI , and the aggregation procedure to use in the evaluation of an 
overall measure ofHI, the analyst is then ready to (compute and) examine the relevant income 
distributions, in our case, the pre and the post-tax income distributions, and to draw some 
conclusions about the degree of HI induced by the income tax for that population, in that 
specific period. Evidently, distinct combinations of selected measure/variable/equivalence 
scale/period/tax unit willlead to distinct conclusions about this degree and about its nonnative 
significance, and th.is is why methodological issues are worth so much concern. 
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4) ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES OF m AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF THE 
lN COME TAX SYSTEM 
In this section, we will present different measures ofHI, always measured as inequality, and 
considering for the case of the Gini coefficient also reranking effects, with an Atkinson-
Piotnick-type indexs0• For pracrical purposes, pre-tax equals are assumed to be the incarne units 
with the sarne pre-tax equivalem incarne (represented by X) and HE would prevail only ifthese 
units payed exactly the sarne tax liability, again in terms of equivalent incarne. Using real 
incarne deflated by an equivalence scale as a proxy of"well-being" makes distinct units (in a 
social heterogeneous population) comparable for normative purposes, as we saw in section 3s1• 
Each group of equals so defined is denoted by S(X), at the levei X of equivalent incarne. The 
tax unit can be the household, the nuclear family, the family or the "equivalent adult", 
depending on the specific study and tax code that an analyst considers. and the assessment 
period is typically the fiscal year. 
The different rneasures that we will consider -the Gini , the MLD, the absolute Gini and 
Atkinson 's index- embody different valuejudgements on the importance ofinequities. on the 
concept ofinequaJity (relative vs. absolute) and imply distinct aggregation procedures. The link 
with the vertical perfonnance of the tax when we have HI will now be rnade clearer, for the 
study ofits implications in the overall perfonnance ofthe tax system. It is necessary to define 
so The measurement of reranking effects has an important and independent place in the analysis of H! , having 
emerged in the 80s with Atkinson and Plotnick"s works and being furtherl y developed with the delin ition of 
families ofmathematical índices, namely by King, Cowell and Jenkins. This specific strand is not covered in our 
work but is deeply treated in Lambert and Ramos (1997b), who also presem simulation resuhs exposing (ordinal) 
similarities and (cardinal) differences in the way indices ofthe different types rank tax changes effects. 
11 The use of real income could only be justified if we assumed that ali tax units had equal tastes, needs and 
abilities. The assumptions underlying the use of equivalent income, although debatable and polemic, are notas 
strong and unrealistic as these and allow a more accurate assessment of H I. 
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the schedule t(X) (for X>O), for the progressive income tax, as the value of the average tax 
payment ofthe units in S(X); ifit were applied indistinctively to ali the tax units in each group 
of pre-tax equals, this tax would be totally horizontally equitable and raise exact1y the sarne 
fiscal revenue as the actual, horizontally inequitable, incarne tax. 
i) Statistica l measurement ofHJ 
We will start by considering two statistical measures of rela tive inequality to assess local and 
global HI, the Gini and the MLD; they imply that any proportional deviation from the mean 
in tax units' post-tax incarnes in each S(X) is valued as Lhe sarne amount ofHI for ali pre-tax 
leveis of incarne. 
The Gini index has been widely used in the study ofHI. Initially, this was dane in such a way 
that it was not possible to distinguish "classical" horizontal inequity effects fram the distinct 
rerank.ing effects52 . h is clear that the incarne tax may lead to changes in the ordering afthe tax 
units frorn the pre to lhe past-tax distribution of incarne: units who were in the sarne group of 
pre-tax equals may be in distinct past-tax ranges; therefore, measures that are built based on 
pre-tax rankings will typically understate the true extent ofinequality in Lhe post-tax incarne 
distribution53. 
We have already mentioned the well-known failure of the Gini index to obey to the 
decornposability property of global inequality into within and between subgroups inequality, 
when there is averlapping of the post-tax incarne ranges. Follawing Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert (1994) a reali stic schedule oftax payments, for any incarne unit with a levei X of 
equivalent incarne, can be established as: t = t(X) + e , with t(X) as before and e being a 
disturbance with zero mean for each levei of equivalent incarne, that reflects precisely the 
Sl See, for instance, Kakwani (1984) where the total redistributive effect oftaxalion is decomposed in terms of 
HE and VE but, in fact, ignoring the classical unequal-treatment-of-equats effect, measuring only the effect of 
reranking. 
H Atkinson (\980) showed that the Gin i coefficient ofpost-tax income is reduced as a consequence ofreranking 
effects oftax units considering post-tax income. 
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existence of "classical" HI for each levei X. The incarne tax, however, can also cause the 
reranking ofthese tax Wlits as a consequence ofthis departure, and this is essentially a distinct 
effect since it occurs berween unequals. 
Using the Gini, we had lhe general expression: G = G8 +~a ... Gk + R, and we can thus express 
the Gini for Lhe post-tax incarne distribution, decomposed across the groups S(X) of pre-tax 
equals, as: 
where G8 , the Gini for between subgroups inequality, measures lhe inequality that would ex.ist 
if every tax unit had payed incarne tax totally according to t(X), i.e. assuming that in each 
subgroup of equals S(X) ali wllts bear an average tax payment, as if no Hl existed; G8 reflects 
thus a vertical feature ofthe tax system. The indices GscX> measure inequality within each group 
S(X), among pre-tax equals that became unequals as a consequence of incarne taxation (local 
HI), with ax representing the weights used for their aggregation; these weights result from the 
product of population and post-tax incarne shares of incarne units in each S(X). and therefore 
are '·impure" (incarne dependent) weights; the total value r~ a x GS(x) is thus a rneasure of 
"classical" Hl. Finally, R, the residual , corresponds in fact to an Atkinson-Plotnick type index 
ofreranking, measuring the magnitude ofthis effect as a result of the existence of inequality 
oftreatment oftax units in each S(X)s4 • 
To re late H! so measured with the overall perfonnance of the incarne tax system, we can 
analyse its effect on the redistributive effect of the tax using the Reynolds-Smolensky index 
ofthe redistributive effect (RE), i.e. ofthe reduction in overall incarne inequality as a result 
of progressive incarne taxation. We have: RE = Gx - Gx-T , where Gx stands for the Gini index 
for pre-tax income55• Considering Gx-T defined as above, the redistributive effect can therefore 
be written as: RE = (Gx - G8 ) - Lx a~ Gscx) - R ; 
s-o The Atkinson-Plotnick index ofreranking is given by: (Gx.r • Cx.r)/20 x-r, with Cx.r being the concentration 
coefficient for the post-tax income distribution ordered by pre-tax ranks, while R "' Gx.r- Cx.r therefore very 
similar to the former. 
11 As we saw in section I, when the income tax is progressive, Gx > G x.r· 
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The term in brackets can be interpreted as the vertical effect ofthe tax (V), its contribution to 
inequality reduction that would be verified if no unequal treatment (in tenns of equivalent 
income) oftax units existed. As we saw, the term :Ex~ GS(XJ represents "classical" Hl (H) and 
R, measures the extent ofthe reranking effects. Rewriting the expression, we have: 
RE~V-H-R, 
with the redistributive effect ofthe tax (its overall performance) being negatively affected both 
by the existence of(classical) HI and ofreranking oftax units. 
ln terms ofwelfare impacts, this reduction in the overall perfonnance ofthe tax (comparatively 
to a reference situation with perfect HE) can be evaluated using Sen 's welfare indexs6: W = J.l. 
{l - G), with J.l. being average income and G, the Gini. We thus have Wx-T as the welfare index 
for the distribution of post-tax equivalent income and W xc1•11 can stand for a measure of the 
welfare level that would prevail after the application, to the sarne pre-tax distribution, of an 
equal-yield proponional tax. lt is immediate that: 
W,r w,,,_,, ~~(I- g). RE ~~(I- g).(V- H- R), (g is the average tax rate) 
or, considering the relation between the Reynolds-Smolensky and the Kakwani index of 
progressivitys7, we also have: Wx.T- WX<l-&l = ).l [ g. K- {1 -g) (H+ R)], being obvious that: 'lhe 
horizontal and reranking terrns borh pro vide subtractions from the welfare superiority of the 
actual tax code over a tlat (distributionall y neutral) one"58 . 
The mean logarithmic dcv iation (MLD) enjoys the property of perfect decornposability 
across the subgroups S(X) of pre-tax equals, allowing us to express global inequality of the 
distribution of post-tax incorne as a weighted sum of inequality within groups and inequality 
between groups (the inequality that would prevail if the tax were perfectly horizontally 
equitable, i.e. if in each subgroup S(X) ali income units payed the incarne tax according solely 
with the progressive t(X), instead ofwith t = t(X) + 8, as explained above). For this rneasure, 
se. Sen (1973). 
S? Please, see the end of section I ofthis work. 
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the weighting system is not dependent on incarne leveis, only on population shares in each 
S(X). 
Therefore, having Msoo as the MLD for the subgroup S(X), rneasuring loca1 HI, MH can stand 
for the index of global Hl introduced as a consequence of incarne taxation: MH = :Ex Px MS(x) 
, with Px representing the appropriate weights: population shares for the subgroups S(X) ofpre-
tax equals. 
To assess the implications of Hl in the overa11 perforrnance ofthe incarne tax system, in terrns 
of its impact in global inequality reduction, we need to consider a1so the "inequality between 
groups" effect if in each subgroup S(X) every incarne unit payed the average tax value for that 
subgroup, there would prevail perfect HE anda rneasure ofthe venica1 effect ofthe tax could 
be obtained under this reasoning, also using the MLD: we can call it M8 (for inequality 
between subgroups, in the hypothetica1 situation when no Hl is present). 
The global inequality prevailing in the post-tax distribution of equivalem incarne is thus: MP 
= M 8 + MH , and the redistributive effect of the tax , generally defined as the difference in 
inequality frorn the preto the post-tax equiva1ent incarne distributions, comes: RE = MPRE- MP 
(with MPRE standing for inequality in pre tax equivalem incarne rneasured by the MLD), or: 
RE ~ (M, .. - M,)- MH ; 
'* Aronson. Johnson and Lambert (1994), p.266. 
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The existence of global Hl represents a loss in the vertical performance -defmed as (MPRE • M8) 
· of the progressive incarne tax, and a reduction in its redistributive effect. A higher levei of 
redistribution of incarne could be achieved by incarne taxation, for exactly the sarne tax 
revenue, ifthe unequal treatment of equals (measured by MH) were removed from the system, 
leading not only to a greater inequality reduction, but also to welfare gains for the tax units in 
each and ali S(X)59• HI worsens the overall performance ofthe incarne tax. 
We will now focus on a statistical rneasure of absolutc inequality to assess local and global 
HI , Lhe absolute Gini; this implies that a deviation of a ftxed amount of incarne frorn the mean 
in tax units'post-tax incarnes in each S(X) is valued as the sarne amount ofHI for ali pre-tax 
leveis of incarne. 
AGS(x) will denote the measure for local Hl: inequality in post-tax equivalent incarne among 
the mernbers of each S(X), that were defined as equals before the tax. The aggregation 
procedure into an overall index of Hl involves, again in this case, apure weighting system: 
AGH = :Ex p/ AGS(X), with Px defined as before. 
The overall performance of the ta.x can be assessed considering the gain in welfare of the 
progressive incarne tax system over the proportional (equal-yield and distributionally neutral) 
altemat ive, given by: 
with !las the average posHa.x incarne and GPRE and Gx.T standing for the (relative) Ginis for 
pre and post tax equivalent incarne distributions. Jfthere were no HI, the change (comparative 
gain) in welfare would have its origin solely on the vertica l redistribution effect, i.e. ó WvR = 
~t (GI'RE- Gu). with G8 denoting the (relative) Gini measuring inequality between subgroups as 
before; therefore, the global (smaller than this) positive variation in welfare comes: 
s9 Atkinson ( 1970). 
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illustrating again that if HI (rneasured as absolute inequality) and reranking were eliminated 
from the tax system a higher welfare levei could be attained (for the sarne tax revenue levei as 
in the actual system) by the income units in ali groups S(Xt0• 
ii) Normative mcasuremeot of HI 
This topic is related to the Atkinson index. Here, HI is considered as a social cost: a certain 
arnount per capita of post-tax equivalent incarne could be "thrown away" in each group S(X) 
in arder to have perfect HE, with no variation in the actual levei of social welfare61 . The per 
capita cost of inequality will stand as the local measure of HI , call it CS{Xl : "Lhe per capita 
incarne saving among the persons in S(X) that would result from equalizing their post-tax 
incarnes with no loss of social welfare'o62• There is an implicit comparison between the actual 
post-tax distribution of(equivalent) income and the distribution that would be observed if ali 
these incarne values were made equal ata lower value (corresponding to the EDE as we saw 
before, and denoted for instance by Ç) than the average post-tax incarne for that group (say, 
llS(x)), due to the nonnative meaning of "the cost of inequaliry"; thi s cost - standing as the 
60 We are following the fonnulation presented in Lambert (1995); however, some inconsistency may be detected 
in this definition ofthe welfare gain 6W, since its rationale Jies in relative, not absolute, inequaliry. 
61 The extent ofH I so measured will depend thus not only on relative inequality ofpost-tax incarne among pre-tax 
equals, but also on the selected degree of inequal ity aversion. 
62 Lambert (1995), p.516. Note that we can interpret "per capita" as "per tax unit '', since we may prefer not to 
restrict the incarne unitto the limiting case of the individual , panicu larly when we are dealing with equivalem 
incarne, as it was assumed; however, for simpliciry of exposition, we can refer to incarne. instead of equivalem 
incarne. 
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measure of local HI - is thus given by: CS(X) = Jlsoo- Çx. 
An overall index of HI can again be built, using in this case apure weighting system: 
eH= LX Px CS{X) ' with Px defined as before. 
To assess Hl's impact in the overaJ I performance ofthe incarne tax system, we can start by 
defining this laner concept as Lhe variation (reduction) in the cost of inequality Lhat the tax 
system allows: tJ. C= CPRE- Cx-T, with CPRE standing for the cost ofinequality in the pre-tax 
incarne distribution and Cx-T denoting the (assumed smaJier) cost of inequality after the incarne 
tax. A hypothetical tax schedule, that would imply remova! of HI welfare-neutrally in any 
group S(X), has to be defined as the locus ofthe points (X, Çx) for ali the incarne range: tWN(X) 
is the welfare-neutral horizontally equitable tax schedule63 - The index eH, of global HI , 
measures precisely the departures from this schedule, in terms ofthe extra tax yield per capita 
(in the whole population oftax units) that could be obtained ifthe inequitable system were 
replaced by tWN(X). The vertical features ofthe taxare then captured by confronting it with this 
latter schedule; ifthe cost of inequality in the post tax incarne distribution after the hypothetical 
application of tWN(X) is denoted by CWN(X) , the vertical performance (VP) of the tax can be 
defined as: VP = CPRE- CWNcxt· Having so defined HI and VP, the overall perfonnance ofthe 
tax system (the achieved reduction in the cost of inequality from the pre to the post-tax 
distributions ofincome) can finally be detennined by: 
illustrating that HI (as in the previous measurement systems considered) causes lasses in the 
overaJI perfonnance ofthe tax. A revenue gain would arise from the elimination ofHJ keeping 
the welfare levei constant. 
Concluding, we saw how the remova! of H1 would improve the perfonnance ofthe incarne tax 
~1 Following the terminology in Lambert (1995). 
"' Note that. for the previous measures, vertical performance was related to a constam revenue (welfare 
improving) replacement ofthe tax schedule by a horizontally equitable w:, while in this approach, VP is assessed 
by comparing the inequitable tax with one which would be equitable but welfare neutral (revenue improving). 
39 
system (in terms of conferring it an extra capaciry to reduce inequaliry - comparatively 
increasing welfare - or to increase tax revenue- keeping social welfare constant); in the cases 
ofstatistical measures ofrelative and absolute inequaliry, this is assessed by comparing the 
actual schedule with a hypothetical revenue neutral (welfare improving) horizontally equitable 
income tax, while in the case of the (explicitly) normative measurement a welfare neutral 
(revenue improving) horizontally equitable schedule is considered as the appropriate reference. 
ln each situation, the particular meaning ofthe measures ofl-ll was, accordingly, established, 
but a com.mon and crucial conclusion is that its existence per se implies a loss in the global 
performance of the incorne tax. 
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5) EMPIRJCAL IMPLEMENTATION 
When we are dealing with empirical work, having selected a particular database, besides ali 
the methodological problems that were discussed in section 3.2, a further difficulty may be the 
"identification problem", particularly ifwe are dealing with relatively small samples: in these 
there is usually a very small number (if any) of "equals" in each S(X), however defined (in 
spite ofthe fact ofexisting in a much larger number in the overall population); this may lead 
to an Wlderestirnation offfi when measured frorn the sample so constituted and, in the extreme 
case of inexistence of exact "equals" in the sample, no H1 would be measured with the sample 
data, although existing in the population oftax units. 
This " identification of equals" problem was typically regarded as making impracticable the 
measurement of "'classical" HI , favoring the reranking approach for its assessment, related 
mainly to the works of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) and, as we saw, a very partia! 
methodology. 
Nowadays, the identification problem has been substantially overcome, and methodologies 
including "classical" I-II and reranking effects have been establi shed and developed6s_ To deal 
specifically with this problem, Lambert (1995) proposes to create bands ofpre~tax equivalent 
incomes (using small bandwidths66), i.e. groups of"close equals", measuring then- using, for 
this, the sarne type of indicators as we referred to in section 467 - pseudo~horizontal inequity 
(PHI) and pseudo~vertical perfonnance (PVP) to obtain a slightly modified version of the 
magnitude ofthe redistributive effect ofthe income tax: "for the interpretation ofthese pseudo~ 
concepts, it is as ifhorizontally, the tax acts to increase inequality within dose equals groups 
6s Remember the analysis done above for the Gini. or see Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994). 
66 The bands can be defined by income ranges -as in Lambert and Ramos ( 1997)- or by quantiles -the approach 
that we will follow- which makes for much simpl ified empirics than used there . 
67 For lhe mathematical definition ofthese "pseudo-indices'", see Lambert (1995), p. I 7/ 18. 
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and verti ca11y. it acts to reduce inequality berween dose equals groups'168• 
t>t Lambert (1995), p.\6. 
42 
Sirnulation exercises69 have proved that measures ofPI-ll and PVP (in small samples) tend to 
the true values ofHl and vertical perfonnance (ofthe whole population ofincorne units) as the 
bandwidths, in each group of close equals, are narrowed. Moreover, the act of sampling, by 
itself implying loss of inforrnation, was shown not to cause serious loss of accuracy in the 
rneasurement exercise. 
Therefore, this new methodology allows us to cape with the identification problem when using 
sample micro data in a serious way, leading to accurate estirnates of HI and overall 
performance of the incarne tax. We have applied it to an Israeli database70, with the Family 
Expendirure Survey data for 1992 of the Central Bureau of Statistics. The original data, 
considering 5212 households ofdifferent compositions as the relevant tax units, included eight 
variables: weights, number of adults in each household, number of children, pre-tax incarne, 
social security benefi.ts, social security taxes, incarne taxes. and a dununy variable accounting 
for workers ' status (salaried vs. self-employed); ali incarne values were in terms of money 
incarne, in "shekels", the Israeli currency. ln our empírica! work the weights were ignored 
(since the study ofthe mathematical implications of their consideration for the indicators that 
were computed is still not sufficiently clear), as well as the dummy variable for ease of 
computation. 
The first step was to determine the money value of''pre-tax incarne plus benefits", and also of 
"pre-tax incarne plus benefits less direct taxes (which include both social security and incarne 
taxes)"; then, the households' money incarne values of pre-tax incarne and these two extra 
variables were transformed into "utility" (equivalent incarne), using the equivalence scale11 : 
Z = (Number of adults + cp.Number of children) 9 , 
with cp accounting for the special needs of children, and 9 for the economies of scale within the 
househo ld (we defined cp =e = Yz). 
69 For further details on this, see Lambert (1995) or Lambert and Ramos ( 1997). 
70 The author tried to get data from her own country, Ponugal. but unfortunately her request to the appropriate 
depanmem ofthe Portuguese Ministry ofFinance was denied. 
71 Following the procedure adopted in Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) 
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Proceeding this way, three new variables were constructed: X, standing for "'pre·tax equiva1ent 
income", XPB as "pre·tax equiva1ent income plus benefits", and XPBMT referring to .. pre·tax 
equivalent income plus benefits minus direct taxes" After sorting this sample by X, the last 
biggest 12 observations72 were deleted to facilitate the calculations, more specifically to a11ow 
the division ofthis data into 100 subsarnples (100 percentile groups) of52 observations each· 
I 00 groups of dose equals, in which the observed values were averaged out. 
The intention ofour study was to measure and analyse the redistributive effects ofbenefits and 
direct taxes, as well as the magnitude of .. classical" HJ 73 and reranking oftax units induced by 
them, in three possible sets: 
a) set I: when comparing X with XPB, i.e. considering the impact of (equivalised) benefits on 
the distribution of pre·tax equivalent income; 
b) set 2: when comparing XPB with XPBMT, i.e. considering the impact of direct taxes on the 
distribution ofpre·tax equivalent income plus benefits; 
c) st:t3: when comparing X with XPBMT, i.e. considering the overall impact ofthe net system 
on the distribution of pre-tax equivalent income. 
ln this, the transforrnatiom from gross to net income is considered to take the forrn: 
X--> X+B--> X+B-T, 
whilst plainly X---+ X -T ~X -T+B is another possibility. The intermediate resu lts will, of 
course, be path-dependent. The chosen sequence indicates that benefits may be taxable, whi lst 
the latter, that benefits would be assessed on a claimant's net income. ln practice, there are 
benefits ofboth kinds in almost any real world tax·benefit system (including the lsrae li one). 
r- ln empirical work., the highest observations in tenns of(equivalent) incarne are typically considered as non· 
representative, so this procedure has no serious implications in tenns of the analysis ofresults. 
n ln ract, what we indeed measured was PHI and PVP, but we will refer to the general concepts for simplicity. 
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Intuitively, we would expect the benefit and the direct tax system both to be progressive 
(implying positive redistributive effects in ali sets). ln terms ofHI, it seems logical that in set 
I it should tend to be greater at the bonom ofthe distribution, while in set 2 it should be greater 
at the top, and in set 3 HI should be spread amongst the whole population; graphically, this 
particular observation tends to be confinned by the ploning of the data for these three cases 
(see the first three graphs in the annex). Moreover, when going from set 2 to set 3, we could 
expect HI to be reinforced, i.e. the direct tax system acting to increase the magnitude of HI 
already induced by the benefit system74• 
The empirical analysis was performed using the Gini index, seing that it allows for the 
decomposition of the redistributive effect (RE) in terms of vertical redistribution, HI and 
reranking's; concretely, we wished to determine: RE; = V; - H; - R, , with i=l , 2, 3, 
corresponding to each of our three sets. 
Using the SPSS computer package, we determined severa! covariances between the variables, 
as well as between the previously determined I 00 mean values, determining ali the re levant 
values for Gini indices and concentration coefficients that allowed us to determine the above-
mentioned decomposition of the RE for the different sets. RE, was computed from the global 
sample of 5200 observations. while V; and R; were determined using the sample with the I 00 
average values76 for the close equals groups; H; was finall y determined by default. The ploning 
ofthe relevant 100 mean values for each ofthe sets can be observed in the Jast three graphs on 
the annex77 • 
The final results can be summarized as follows, in terms of the computed absolute values and 
the corresponding percentage values: 
7~ The opposite effect could happen, i. e. direct taxes acting as contributing to diminish global H I, when applied 
to the XPB distributíon, but this does not seem so probable as the inverse. 
7s See sections 3.2 b) i) and 4 i) ofthis work for funher details on the use ofthe Gini in the measurement ofHl 
and the corresponding fonnulae and notation. 
76 Soned by X for sets I and 3, and by XPB for set 2. 
n These show X-t{X) against X, in our earlier notation ; they ali provide evidence ofprogression. 
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RE; V; H; R; 
i -1 0.08003 0.0906 0.01017 0.0004 
100% 1/3.2075% 12. 7077% 0.4998% 
i-2 0.04994 0.0541 0.00414 0.00002 
100% 108.3299% 8.2899% 0.04% 
i-3 0.12997 0.1499 0.01683 0.0013 
100% 115.3343% /4.3341% 1.0002% 
T ABLE. Israel! benejit {1-1}, d1rect tax (r-2) and net tax (1-3) systems. redmnbuuve effect, vertical and 
horizontal inequiry. 
The analysis of these results leads to a confirmation of our a priori intuitions: in respect of 
Israel, both the benefit and the direct tax systems are progressive (with positive RE), i. e. 
inequality-reducing and welfare-improving, either when considered as acting "separately" (sets 
1 and 2), or jointly (set 3). Moreover, the magnitude of HI is quite relevant. induced by the 
action of each of the systems (sets I and 2), and being reinforced when we consider the joint 
action of the net system (set 3). 
These conc\usions, however, should be relativised since, on the one hand, a deeper 
mathematical study on the possibilities of comparing and relating the above-presented figures 
is needed, and, on the other, the statistical inference to the global Jsraeli population is of 
questionable valid ity. Funher future research on these two topics would, therefore, be useful , 
as, indeed, would a comparison of the intem1ediate resu lts with those coming from the 
altemative sequencing of direct taxes and benefits. 
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